If it be the bargain between us that I am to lead an expedition into this difficult region of thought, I shall do my best
to keep my part of it. But we have to recognize that the
bargain makes severe demands on both sides. For it lays
down that we adopt an intellectual approach to a theme more
often pursued along less austere paths. Those who would
tread the rough road along which I think you are wanting me
to lead you must be ever ready to accept the evidence of hard
facts, even though the evidence refutes cherished convictions,
even though it reverses conclusions that have the sanction of
long established tradition. Facts are hard taskmasters. They
have to be met with courage, particularly the unwelcome
ones, those that threaten our complacency. And it is so
much easier to dodge them than to face them. Logic is a still
harder taskmaster. It demands that we interpret the facts
according to its strict rules and not according to our inclinations.
Honesty requires that everyone should recognize what a
large part faith plays in the composition of his view of reality.
We could not do our jobs if we applied an elaborate test to
every belief that provided the basis of our conduct. In our
simplest activities we are often guided by assumptions that
we could not prove. We should not accomplish much if we
spent all the time that would be necessary to justify every
detail of our faith. Indeed faith unsupported by facts is a
practical necessity of everyday life; it is not peculiar to
theology. It is only when he finds that his faith is contradicted
by facts that an intellectually honest man must surrender it.
In a conflict between faith and facts the facts must win.
I propose to show in these lectures that there is a contradiction between a number of scientific facts and the materialist's faith in the powers and accomplishments of matter. The
contradiction is so complete that every form of monistic
philosophy must be discarded. And I shall show that there
does not seem to be a similar unavoidable contradiction between any known facts and a dualistic view of reality. What
I hope to convince you of is this: It is arguable that dualism
cannot be proved right; it is certain that monism can be
proved wrong.
My reasons were as follows. When many years ago I
sought an answer to the question whether non-material influences can exert an influence on material events, I began to
read those books on the subject that had been recommended
to me. I expected to find that each new contribution to the
subject would have taken some aspect out of the region of
uncertainty and dispute and into the region of accepted
knowledge. But I was greatly disappointed. What I found
was that the same alignments persisted, some scientists supporting a monistic, others a dualistic philosophy. Changes in
thought there were. We have had since the beginning of the
century a succession of monistic doctrines: mechanism,
emergent vitalism, holism, logical positivism, cybernetics.
The supporters of each have claimed that their predecessors
were wrong and that at last the problem was near solution. But
none of these 'isms' has been incorporated into the body of
scientific thought. The decades have not brought progress,
only changes of fashion. But here I must forestall a possible
misunderstanding. I am not saying that philosophy can show
no progress in any field; only that it can show none in this
particular field.
The supporters of these 'isms' do not say that the problem
cannot be solved. They say that they are in process of solving
it. The conclusion to which I have been led is that most
regrettably undisciplined thinking has been brought to this
field in the past. Thus it will continue if those who enter the
field do so in the hope of proving something. The task before
us is to find the right path by which to approach a very difficult problem, and we must never allow ourselves to be influenced by fear of the direction in which that path may take
us. It is true that the path indicated by disciplined thinking
seems to lead in the direction of dualism. But to announce
that at the beginning of the journey is not to say that I have
chosen the path because it would lead us there. When I set
out as a solitary explorer I did not know where the path would
take me.
Another danger in announcing one's conclusion beforehand is that it may lead to a false expectation of the path that
is going to be followed. A person who expects a certain line
of reasoning is more troubled and confused when led along
unfamiliar paths than he would be if he had started with no
preconceived idea of the path on which he would be taken.
When the theme is the question whether non-material
influences have a real existence or not this danger is particularly
evident. The expectation is only too likely to be that everything said will rebut what every materialist thinks and will
confirm everything that the idealist has been saying all his
life. And such an expectation is going to be disappointed
many times in the course of these lectures. I have undertaken
to discuss a subject that has been mightily confused in the
past. Often arguments are used by both sides that, when
carefully examined, are seen to support their opponents' case
and to refute their own. So traditional reasoning in this field
will have to be severely criticized at times. We shall have to
be prepared to reverse some conclusions that have seemed
to be axiomatic. We shall then be tempted to dodge or deny
facts and arguments. But it is a part of the bargain between
us that we shall resist the temptation. In our hard quest for a
true understanding of the nature of reality we must be on our
guard against complacency, bias, self-indulgent thinking,
intellectual dishonesty, evasiveness, intolerance of disquieting conclusions. A conclusion based on the criterion of attractiveness must always yield to one based on the criterion of
truth. We must always be prepared to accept the evidence of
facts, even when they lead to a conclusion that is the direct
opposite of what we have come to take for granted, even
though it means the surrender for evermore of what seems
easy to believe, or nice to believe, or consoling to believe,
or good policy to believe, or what common sense causes us to
believe. Common sense, be it remembered, has been proved
in science again and again to be a most fallible instrument.
We shall, I fear, sometimes fail in our high purpose of
seeking truth regardless of the consequence. You as well as I. For the theme of these lectures demands the highest standards of sincerity and integrity; and these virtues are among
the most elusive. They dwell on steeper summits than many
of those virtues that are more often on men's lips. Yet it is
only from those rugged heights that a clear view of truth can
be achieved.
Monism and Dualism
Let us distinguish as precisely as we can between those
two opposed views of the nature of reality that are called
respectively monism and dualism. According to monism,
matter constitutes the whole of reality.1 Everything that
happens, though it appear to be in the realm of thought, is
interpreted as being entirely the result of the interaction of
material systems. A living, a thinking being is declared to
consist of its material body and of nothing else. What we
speak of as mind is said to be nothing but a property of the
material brain, an inevitable consequence of the chemical
and physical structure of that organ.
Monistic religions exist. In some of them deities are
identified with objects to be found in nature, with mountains,
rivers, thunderstorms, the sun, the moon. In other monistic
religions deities are identified with carved images. A religion
in which the diety is believed to be non-material is a dualistic
one. But dualists usually postulate other non-material influences in addition to a deity. Among these they mention
mind, the soul, entelechy, elan vitale. There is an advantage
in having a collective word for the various non-material
influences that can have a place in a dualistic philosophy; and
such a word should preferably be non-evocative. For this
and other reasons I have elsewhere used the word 'diathete'.2
I propose to use it here. Dualism is the belief that the whole
of reality is composed of two parts, one named matter and
the other diathetes. Some events are held to happen because
these two component parts act on each other.
To say that diathetes sometimes act on matter is, of course,
not to deny that matter also acts on matter. We all know that
it does. The physical sciences are the study of the way matter
acts on matter. It happens when a stone falls to the ground,
when the moon causes tides, when the wind disturbs the
surface of a sheet of water, when we digest our food, when
our eyes respond to light waves. Whenever we react to our
material surroundings matter is acting on matter. That is
agreed in all schools. What is in dispute is whether it is the
only kind of action to shape the course of events. According
to monism it is; according to dualism there are occasions
when a material system, a living body for instance, is subjected simultaneously to two kinds of action on it, to the
action of other material systems and also to the action of a
diathete. The behaviour of our bodies is claimed by dualists
to depend partly on material things, on what we see and hear
and touch; but partly also on what, to use my terminology, a
diathete, the mind, thinks, in the Descartian sense of the
word, about the material stimuli that we receive. This is
believed by dualists to control some of our behaviour. Applied
to the human body the distinction between the monistic and
the dualistic interpretation of its behaviour can be expressed
thus: The monist says that the behaviour is controlled by the
chemical and physical system that constitutes the body in
response to the material environment and by nothing else;
the dualist agrees about the part played by the material
environment but denies that the material body alone determines the behaviour. He sees material circumstances and the
diathete as combining in producing the resultant behaviour.
This leads us to one of many occasions when a rather
prevalent misconception has to be corrected. Dualism is too
often represented as identical with belief in indeterminacy.
But it is really almost the opposite. Dualism includes the
belief that, far from being indeterminate, some events are
doubly determinate, determined in part by the action of
matter on matter and in part by the action of diathetes on
matter. It can be called the belief in the aided action of
matter on matter. By contrast monism is belief in the unaided
action of matter on matter. But it is not of course inherent in
dualism to believe that diathetes act continuously and on
every material system. A dualist is free to say that interaction
between the two components of reality occurs sometimes and
does not occur at other times.
Is Religion Necessarily Dualistic?
Many primitive religions are, as I have just pointed out,
monistic. But is it necessary for the religions of our Western
civilization to be dualistic? One's first impulse is to say 'Yes,
most certainly.' But second thoughts may arouse doubts.
The answer depends on the meaning given to the word
matter. In a basic distinction between matter and non-material influences one must not define matter in a narrow
sense. Only a very unsophisticated person would say that the
distinction between matter and non-material influences was
the same as the distinction between solids and gases, that the
body was solid and the soul a gas. And as a person's philosophical education progressed he would widen his definition
of matter by successive stages. For the purpose of distinguishing between monism and dualism he would find it
necessary to include not only all gases within his definition
of matter but also even more tenuous substances. He would
find that the line he drew between what he called matter
and what he called non-material had to be repeatedly redrawn. At one stage of his education he might place electricity
on the non-material side of the line. It does happen that
persons who believe life to be non-material also expound the
theory that it is electricity. The criterion by which they judge
what is non-material is mysteriousness, incomprehensibility.
But to ask in what units life should then be measured,
whether in volts, or amperes, or watts, would help them to
understand that electricity too belongs to the physicist's
world, is a part of the material universe. If it is to mean anything when one distinguishes between matter and non-material influences one must define matter so as to include
everything that is composed of molecules, atoms, electrons,
protons, as well as light and other forms of radiation, as well
as magnetic fields, as well as everything else, indeed, that
belongs to the physicist's universe of discourse. The criterion
by which to decide what is non-material cannot be tenuousness; it cannot be mysteriousness. In my book Mind, Life
and Body I have shown why it is necessary to define matter so
widely as to include everything that has location; that as a
consequence a non-material influence, a diathete, does not
have location; that if it lacks location it cannot be seen,
heard, touched, or detected by any other physical means;
and lastly that one cannot escape from the disturbing consequences of this conclusion by using 'everywhere' as a
synonym for 'nowhere'.
Those are positive statements about matter and negative
ones about diathetes. Positive statements about diathetes and
negative ones about matter can also be made.
Diathetes, according to those who believe in their existence,
are active realities. To say what they can do is to make a
positive statement about them. They can act on certain material
systems and in doing so produce specific results; the effect is
to create order. When the diathete is a mind, for instance,
and the material system acted upon is a human body, the
result is the person's controlled behaviour. Similarly, to say
what matter cannot do is to make the negative statement
about matter. According to dualism matter is not capable of
exercising control or of creating specified order; in the
absence of a diathete its behaviour is random. But monists
do not accept this negative statement; according to them
matter is capable of doing these things; where we observe
order it is always, they say, the result of the unaided action
of matter on matter. The distinction between the two opposed
doctrines can be put simply thus: according to monism order
results from what matter does; according to dualism order
results from what is done to matter by a diathete. A decision
between these opposed theories depends, as I have said
already, not on our knowledge of the nature of God, or of the
soul, or of mind, but on our knowledge of the nature of
matter. If matter is capable of doing all the things that
monists claim for it, monism is justified.
The positive statement made above about diathetes is not
likely to cause offence to any religious person, but the negative statement may do so. It is better to face this than to dodge
it; so be it recognized that it is discomforting to have to say
that a diathete lacks location and still more discomforting
when one replaces words with classical roots by words with
Anglo-Saxon ones and says that God, the thinker, the soul
are nowhere. A person who believes firmly in spiritual influences and is convinced that the physical sciences cannot
cover the whole of reality may yet, I fear, dislike that word
'nowhere'. Let this be illustrated by the answers that a
philosophically educated person would have to give to questions about, say, the soul:
'What is the colour of the soul?'
‘It has no colour.'
'How many ounces does it weigh?'
'It has no weight.'
'Of how many atoms is it composed?'
'Of no atoms.'
'What is its shape?'
It has no shape.'
'How large is it?'
'It has no size.'
'Where is it?'
'Nowhere.'
'Does it exist?'
It does.' |
'But how do you know that it exists if the soul has no
physical attributes by means of which it can be detected?'
is the obvious further question. It is not known by what it is
but by what it does', is one answer. 'It can be proved with the
help of our knowledge of physics that the course of certain
observed material events would be different if the body were
not controlled by some non-material influence. You may, if
you choose, call that influence a soul, or life, or just a
diathete.' Another answer is that some diathetes, mind for
instance, if not the soul, are observable. The observation is
not conducted, it is true, by physical means; it is not achieved
by any objective process, but by a subjective process, by self-knowledge. While the existence of a mind can only be known
to others by what it does, it is known to itself by what it is.
Translated into philosophical language this answer means
that subjective experience is real experience and must have a
place in a complete view of the nature of reality. The fact
that it has no place in the physicist's world does not prove,
as is sometimes wrongly asserted, that subjective experience
is not real. It proves that the physicist's world does not comprise the whole of reality.
But it takes some effort of logical thinking to understand
that a thing can be real, active, and yet nowhere. Does religion, one has to ask in all seriousness, require this degree of
sophistication ? Does the theologian need to tell his congregation that heaven is nowhere ? He may himself be convinced
that no other view is tenable. But need he say so? Is it
contrary to religious thought to allow a congregation to
believe that the soul literally gets out of the body and undertakes a journey to some place situated at a finite, if unknown,
distance from the earth, where its latitude and longitude
could be entered on charts of the sky once it had been seen
in a telescope? Is it necessary to disturb the simple faith of
those who picture their God as having human form and
clothed in flowing garments? May it not be perfectly
compatible with Christianity to believe that the human
mind is no more than a manifestation of the chemical
and physical structure of the brain and that every mode of
human behaviour could be reproduced by a mechanical
model?
It is not for me to pronounce on such questions. But I
venture to think that it is not necessary, would not even be
right, for the theologian to insist pedantically on a scientific
and philosophical distinction between monism and dualism.
I doubt whether Christianity would lose much if it asserted
that God, the mind, the soul have properties that bring them
within a definition of matter. The question whether those
things that the theologian regards as of the spirit have location or not must seem to him rather a trivial one. While he
must always deprecate a moral materialism he must also
tolerate any extreme of intellectual materialism. I doubt in-
deed whether monism is bad religion. But I am sure that it
is bad science.
The theologian can afford to ignore the conclusion, sound
though it be, that any influences capable of creating order
are necessarily nowhere. For that conclusion does not affect
his conception of the nature of those influences. But the
scientist cannot afford to ignore it. For the conclusion does
affect his conception of the nature of space. According to
the judgement of common sense, long accepted uncritically
in science, space is the container of all reality. Other views of
the nature of space held by common sense have had to go
during the last half-century. If dualism is true, this one will
have to go too. And it has come to be realized that a proper
understanding of the nature of space is important for the
progress of physics.
This is one of the occasions when I have to ask you to
reverse an opinion that has become traditional. It is generally
taken for granted that a decision between dualism and
monism is very important in theology and that the question
has no interest for scientists. It may therefore appear to you
that I am talking in paradoxes when I say that the theme of
these lectures matters greatly to scientists and hardly at all to
theologians. In thus asking you to reverse what may have
become an ingrained notion I may, I fear, leave you wondering whether I really mean it. And the best way of relieving
you of any such uncertainty is simply to say that I do. Let
me dwell a little more on the reason why the theme is important in science.
Monists assume, as I have just said, that matter is capable
of creating order. I have quoted many assertions to that
effect by adherents of monistic schools in my book Science
versus Materialism and I showed there that properties inevitably attributed by monists to matter have not been
reconciled with what one may read about matter in textbooks
on physics. Dualism, on the other hand, implies not only
some revision of our notions about space, but also, as I have
pointed out in my previous books, sundry other conclusions
that belong wholly to science. In physics it implies what I
have called a Principle of Incomplete Determinateness. In
biology it implies that living substance contains what I have
called 'eudiathetous mechanisms'. These are devices analogous to the controls of a machine and serve as the instruments that enable a diathete to influence the course of
material events. The implications of both doctrines may be
unwelcome to scientists, those of monism just as much as
those of dualism. But sooner or later one of these two doctrines will have to be accepted and its disquieting consequences faced. If acceptance of monism, with its unorthodox
views about the nature of matter, would cause our scientific
textbooks to be rewritten so would acceptance of dualism.
A decision, whichever way it goes, must disturb scientific
complacency. But the disturbance would advance science
by a great bound. On the other hand, I do not think that
it will upset any established religious faith much, even if
the decision eventually favours monism. That is why
I say that the discussion concerns science more than
theology.
How to Decide between Monism and 'Dualism
An assessment of the rival claims of monism and dualism
can be made after treading a variety of paths. I have only the
time to follow one of them. You may, however, be expecting
me to follow a different one and when an expectation is not
fulfilled the result may be confusing, as I have already
mentioned. So it may help if I briefly tell you first what I do
not intend to do.
A theme sometimes chosen as a starting-point for our
study is the properties of mind. The reality of thought and
feeling, of all subjective experience is used as proof that the
objective world, as revealed by a study of matter, does not
encompass the whole of reality. I have mentioned this argument a little while ago and do not wish to underestimate its
importance. But I do not propose to develop it here. My
reason is that it tends to lead to an incomplete picture of
reality. Let me take a few moments to explain how this
comes about.
Subjective experience can only be discussed in terms of
conscious experience. And it is associated in most people's
minds with the exercise of free will. For these two reasons
its discussion leads to the conclusion that the only diathetes
are those that can be observed in consciousness, and that
only when we exercise free will are our actions controlled
by a diathete. Reasoned behaviour is represented by this line
of argument as demonstrating the control of matter by a non-material influence and instinctive behaviour as resulting
from the unaided action of matter on matter. The conclusion
is at least implied that mind is the only diathete. The distinction between conscious behaviour and vegetative processes
is treated as basic and the distinction between the organic
and the inorganic world as superficial. Of all substances the
brain of man alone appears then as capable of being controlled by a diathete, as being equipped with what I have
called 'eudiathetous mechanisms'.
Such a view I must regard as logically and scientifically
untenable. My reason for saying so will appear during the
following lectures. I propose to show that if dualism is right,
if one can make a distinction between systems that are controllable by a diathete and systems that are not, the dividing
line cannot leave the human brain on one side of it and all
other substance, living and lifeless, on the other. The true
dividing line, we shall find, separates all living from all lifeless substance. A diathete can exercise direct control over
any living substance and either only indirect control or none
over all lifeless substance.
This is why I shall follow the other path briefly mentioned
already, the one that pursues an investigation into the properties and limitations of matter and seeks to discover
whether matter is capable of the achievements with which it
is credited by monists. But here again you may be expecting
a somewhat different approach from the one that I shall
adopt.
Those who, for religious or ethical reasons, wish to combat
materialism often give examples of things that matter cannot
do. But they nearly always limit their choice to examples of
what they regard as 'higher things'. 'An assembly of chemical
substances', they say, 'cannot produce the plays of Shakespeare or the symphonies of Beethoven.' True perhaps. But
the implication is that it can produce less exalted achievements. The emphasis is on values, and a search for scientific
truth is not helped when it is coupled with moral or aesthetic
judgements. Any arguments based on the beauties of the
world around us and the wonders of science would suffer
from the same misplaced emphasis. It would be appropriate
in a sermon but not in the kind of sober pursuit of understanding that I believe you are wanting from me.
Another misconception that should be mentioned only
so as to be dismissed is that the reality of non-material influences can best be confirmed or refuted by a study of some
recent, unusual and startling discoveries. Those made in
psychical research are quoted so frequently as leading to a
better understanding of the nature of reality in its widest
aspects that I fear you will expect me to base my reasoning
on these or similar recondite observations. Or perhaps you
will expect me to talk about cybernetics and feed-back and
electronic devices and experiments in precognition. For
these have recently come to the notice of people other
than engineers and figure largely in the now fashionable
philosophies. But I do not intend to use any unfamiliar
observations at all. I do not think that they are relevant.
The most relevant facts, I have become convinced, are the
very familiar ones. They are so familiar to us all that we
tend to overlook their significance. That should really be
obvious. If the whole of reality consists of two parts, matter
and diathetes, this dualism must be evident in many places;
everyday occurrences, such as may seem trivial, must pro
vide the material for a decision between monism and dualism
if a decision can be reached at all. If a line of reasoning
conveys the impression that non-material influences reserve
their activities for the production of only the best music and
literature and for the sequence in which playing cards appear,
it cannot be a sound line.
The line of reasoning that I do propose to put before you has been hinted at already. Some things display a property that receives the name ‘order’. The word distinguishes them from things that do not display the same property and are said to display lack of order. When the lack is complete one says that they display chaos. Events that lead to an ordered result are called ordered events and those that do not are called random events. The monist claims that all ordered as well as all random events occur as a result of the unaided action of matter upon matter. The operative word is ‘all’. If it were found that but one example of order refuted the monist’s claim, his doctrine would have to go. And we shall find, when I put before you in the succeeding lectures the relevant evidence that not only one, but a whole wide range of phenomena refute the claims of the monist.
Notes
1 The word monism can also be applied to a philosophy in which the
reality of matter is denied and only non-material influences are recognized.
But this alternative meaning of the word is not relevant to what I have to say
here.
2 Science versus Materialism, Methuen, 1940; Mind, Life and Body, Constable, 1951.
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